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INTRODUCTION

Exempting certain classes of people from the possibility of the
death penalty is hardly new; Blackstone noted the common law
prohibition on executing the insane, stating that "furiosusfurore solum
punitur"-madnessis its own punishment.' Even then, however, "the
reasons for the rule [were] less sure and less uniform than the rule
itself." 2 In the United States, Eighth Amendment jurisprudence does
little to clarify the reasons behind a particular death penalty exemption
because it relies, in part, on the practice of the states to decide what is
outside the bounds of acceptable punishment. 3 Because exemptions are
thus dependent on state actions, the reasoning behind any particular
death penalty exemption is a step removed from the states' underlying
reasons for their own practices. These states' conclusions, analyzed by
the Court independently from their underlying reasons, then become
the "objective indicia" the Court uses to determine whether a
punishment is valid under the Eighth Amendment. Ironically, these
conclusions are considered "the clearest and most reliable objective
evidence of contemporary values," even when the reasons behind the
legislatures' votes are not considered. 4
Yet even when all factors point toward granting an exemption,
clarity on the scope of the exemption does not necessarily follow. When
the Court in Atkins v. Virginia exempted defendants with intellectual
disabilities (formerly "mental retardation") from execution, it left to the
states the decision of how to define intellectual disability.5 The Court
did, however, leave the states with some guidance, noting that the
statutory definitions of mental retardation in states that had already
implemented an exemption for intellectual disability "generally
conform[ed] to the clinical definitions" of the American Psychological
Association ("APA") and the American Association on Intellectual and
Developmental Disabilities ("AAIDD").6 Those definitions specify that
a defendant must have (a) intellectual deficits and (b) adaptive deficits
that (c) manifested during the developmental period (i.e., before age
eighteen). 7

1.
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-25, *395; see Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 407-08 (1986) (applying the same philosophy in the United States).
2.
Ford, 477 U.S. at 407.
3.
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
4.
Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
5.
Id. at 317.
6.
Id. at 308 n.3, 317 & n.22.
7.

Am. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS

33, 37-38 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]; see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
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Leaving the definition of intellectual disability to the states
created two potential problems. First, some states required defendants
to prove more than just the clinical definitions to make an Atkins case.
Texas, for example, found the adaptive prong "exceedingly subjective"
and supplemented it with seven additional factors not used in APA or
AAIDD diagnostic criteria.8 Separately, a group of at least three 9 other
states imposed a strict IQ cutoff score of seventy, even though clinical
definitions interpret IQ for intellectual disability as a range that can
extend to seventy-five. 10
Second, the clinical definitions are underinclusive because they
are designed to aid clinicians in diagnosing intellectual disability, not
to separate defendants into those who do or do not deserve the death
penalty." This highlights the poor fit between clinical definitions
designed by and for medical practitioners and the penological aims of
the death penalty. Even the act of questioning which defendants are
categorically undeserving of the death penalty reveals a further oddity

STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV-TR]

(age-of-onset set at age eighteen). Because Atkins was decided while the DSM-IV-TR's ageeighteen requirement was current, the states use age eighteen as the cutoff. See Atkins, 536 U.S.
at 308 n.3 (describing definitions of two professional organizations, both of which include the ageof-onset at eighteen years).
Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
8.
9.
The lack of uniformity even applies when determining which states had a cutoff. While
Florida, Kentucky, and Virginia had the cutoff legislatively, Alabama had one by judicial decision,
making its relevance to objective indicia murky. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996 (2014).
Five other states had statutes allowing for such a cutoff, but had either conflicting statutes or no
case law on whether to apply the standard error of measurement of the IQ test. Id.
10. Id. at 1995-96.
11. See DSM-5, supra note 7, at 25:
When DSM-5 categories, criteria, and textual descriptions are employed for forensic
purposes, there is a risk that diagnostic information will be misused or misunderstood.
These dangers arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate
concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis.... It is precisely
because impairments, abilities, and disabilities vary widely within each diagnostic
category that assignment of a particular diagnosis does not imply a specific level of
impairment or disability.
The American Bar Association, American Psychiatric Association, and the APA, in a joint
resolution, specifically condemned the practice of requiring defendants to show impairment before
age eighteen, as per the age-of-onset prong, to be excluded from the death penalty. AM. BAR ASS'N,
RECOMMENDATION

122A: MENTAL ILLNESS RESOLUTION (2006),

http://www.americanbar.org/

groups/committees/death-penalty representation/resources/dp-policy/mental-illness-200

6

.html

[https://perma.ccfKH3C-BPE9] [hereinafter RECOMMENDATION 122A]; AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT ON
RECOMMENDATION 122A: MENTAL ILLNESS RESOLUTION (2006), http://www.americanbar.org/

content/dam/abaluncategorized/DeathPenalty-Representation/2006 am_122a.authcheckdam.pd
f [https://perma.ccl7ZJN-VYWP] [hereinafter REPORT ON RECOMMENDATION 122A]; AM. PSYCHOL.
ASS'N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY 1 (2006),

http://www.apa.org/pubs/info/reports/mental-disability-and-death-penalty.pdf
3B87-MPZ9] (APA version).

[https://perma.cc/
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of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence: the objective indicia prong merely
indicates how many states agree with a particular exemption. As such,
any search for reasoning behind what classes of defendants are or are
not culpable enough for the death penalty will ultimately find itself with
a bare legislative pronouncement of that culpability. Thus, a deeper,
culpability-based rationale is difficult to find either in clinical
definitions or in legislative pronouncements.
This problem can be more clearly understood by comparing
defendants who fall within clinical definitions to those who fall just
outside of them. One example is the defendant who can show deficits in
the intellectual and adaptive prongs, but cannot satisfy the age-of-onset
prong--either because the condition manifested after age eighteen or
because sufficient evidence does not exist. 12 Defendants in this
situation are not treated as intellectually disabled for the purpose of the
Atkins exception, even though they are no more culpable than those
defendants with the condition. Clinical definitions might therefore be
underinclusive.
In 2014, the Supreme Court addressed the first problem of states
imposing additional requirements, while aggravating the second
problem of the fit between clinical definitions and penological purposes.
In Hall v. Florida, the Court rejected Florida's strict IQ cutoff because
it strayed too far from clinical definitions that required incorporating
the standard error of measurement ("SEM") into IQ tests.13 The Hall
Court noted that clinical definitions were a "fundamental premise" of
Atkins and that Atkins provides "substantial guidance on the definition
of intellectual disability." 14 And while the Court admitted that Atkins
"did not provide definitive procedural or substantive guides for
determining" the proper definitions, it held that "Atkins did not give the
States unfettered discretion to define the full scope of the constitutional
protection."15
The pileup of Hall's seemingly contradictory statements causes
confusion about how closely states must adhere to clinical definitions.
12. Steven J. Mulroy, Execution by Accident: Evidentiary and ConstitutionalProblems with
the "Childhood Onset"Requirement in Atkins Claims, 37 VT. L. REV. 591, 645 (2013).
13. 134 S. Ct. at 2001.
14. Id. at 1999 ("[C]1inical definitions ... were a fundamental premise ofAtkins."); id. ("This
Court thus reads Atkins to provide substantial guidance on the definition of intellectual
disability.").
15. Id. at 1998 ("It is true that Atkins 'did not provide definitive procedural or substantive
guides for determining when a person who claims [intellectual disability]' falls within the
protectionof the Eighth Amendment." (quoting Bobbyv. Bies, 556U.S. 825, 831 (2009))); id. ("[T]he
States play a critical role in . . . contribut[ing] to an understanding of how intellectual disability
should be measured and assessed. But Atkins did not give the States unfettered discretion to define
the full scope of the constitutional protection.").
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Although Atkins appeared to leave the question of definitions to the
states, Hall was clear that this discretion was not "unfettered"-yet it
did nothing to define the bounds of those fetters. Worse still, Hall
complicated the underinclusiveness problem by appearing to require
stronger adherence to the very clinical definitions that exclude similarly
situated defendants.
The Court did no better in explaining Atkins's requirement to
the states, or in addressing the underinclusiveness problem, in its next
case on the subject. In Moore v. Texas, the Court invalidated additional
adaptive prong requirements and other practices used by Texas that
contradicted "medical standards." 16 The Court held that Texas's
practices were unconstitutional because they created an "unacceptable
risk" of execution of defendants covered by Atkins.17 Like earlier cases,
Moore again claimed that states retain some ability to craft definitions
of intellectual disability, writing that" 'the views of medical experts' do
not 'dictate' a court's intellectual-disability determination." 18 And yet
the Court did little to help the underinclusiveness problem when it held
that the Texas practices at issue were invalid precisely because they
"disregard[ed] current medical standards" 19 and "diminish[ed] the force
of the medical community's consensus." 20
As the dissent noted, Moore's prohibition on "disregard[ing]"
clinical practice did nothing to clarify how closely states must follow
medical practice in establishing definitions of intellectual disability. 21
However, Moore did provide insight into both its own commands to the
states, and those commands in Hall, when it relied so heavily on the
"unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be
executed." 22 Relying on neither the "objective indicia" of the states nor
on the Court's own "independent judgment" of penological purposes,
Moore elevated "unacceptable risk" to a core Eighth Amendment
principle that could supply an independent reason for striking a state's
practice as unconstitutional. 2 3
A focus on "unacceptable risk" also has implications for resolving
problems of underinclusiveness. The root of the underinclusiveness
problem is the objective part of Eighth Amendment analysis. If
"evolving standards of decency," as measured by the states' laws and
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, 2017 WL 1136278, at *4, *8 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2017).
Id. at *9, *12.
Id. at *9 (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2000).
Id.
Id. at *4.
See id. at *22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (expressing confusion).
See id. at *4 (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990).
See infra Part II.C.2 (describing Moore's view of risk).
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actions, do not grant a death penalty exemption, then no Eighth
Amendment challenge is possible: the states have spoken. However,
taking this too literally conflicts with one premise of Atkins: states must
be free (within some boundaries) to choose their own definitions. 24 If
states must define intellectual disability the way the majority of other
states do, then this is no choice at all-a proposition that Hall and
Moore both reject. 25 Determining the requirements of Hall and Moore
in a way that resolves this problem, then, should not look directly to the
Eighth Amendment; rather, the best way to determine the extent to
which the Court requires clinical definitions is to interpret its cases
through the lens of the Equal Protection Clause. 26
Such an interpretation would look toward whether the
defendant in question is sufficiently similar to one who qualifies for an
exemption under clinical definitions. As such, objective indicia from the
states would have no bearing on the question; the counting of legislative
pronouncements only shows who is exempted, not why, and therefore
cannot supply the reasoning behind an exception. It is this reasoning,
which is absent when considering objective indicia, that must provide
the criteria for what constitutes a similarly situated defendant. As such,
the Court's independent judgment in Hall and its characterization of
risk in Moore should be examined instead. After all, an equal protection
challenge would not depend on the number of states that treat similar
defendants differently-this would be the precise practice being
challenged. Instead, determining which defendants are so similar as to
require the same treatment should focus on the Court's independent
judgment on culpability and the risk that similarly situated defendants
would face execution.
This Note will proceed in three parts. Part I discusses how
Atkins left definitions of intellectual disability to the states and the

24. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (leaving to the states the task of defining
intellectual disability).
25. Moore, 2017 WL 1136278, at *9 (reading Hall to mean "that being informed by the
medical community does not demand adherence to everything stated in the latest medical guide");
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998 ("[Tjhe States play a critical role in advancing protections and providing
the Court with information that contributes to an understanding of how intellectual disability
should be measured and assessed.").
26.
For equal protection challenges to death penalty exemptions, see Nita A. Farahany,
Cruel and Unequal Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 859 (2009) (challenging lack of protection
for defendants with serious mental illness under strict scrutiny for fundamental rights); Mulroy,
supra note 12 (challenging age-of-onset prong); Christopher Slobogin, What Atkins Could Mean
for People with Mental Illness, 33 N.M. L. REV. 293 (2003) (challenging lack of protection for
defendants with serious mental illness under heightened scrutiny).
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resultant equal protection problems that arose when states chose
underinclusive definitions.
Part II then describes Hall and Moore's statements about how
closely states must adhere to those clinical definitions. Far from
clarifying the extent to which clinical definitions are controlling, Hall
and Moore have given only a vague solution to the problem of additional
requirements while exacerbating the underinclusiveness of clinical
definitions of intellectual disability.
In Part III, this Note proposes a solution by which Hall and
Moore require clinical definitions as a floor of protection for additional
requirements while being interpreted through the lens of the Equal
Protection Clause for underinclusiveness. Because equal protection has
no objective indicia requirement, it is a better framework for solving the
underinclusiveness problem. That framework can take advantage of the
Eighth Amendment's independent judgment jurisprudence and Moore's
increased focus on risk to provide a mechanism to determine which
persons are similarly situated and therefore warrant equal treatment.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH ATKINS

In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court overruled its decision
in Penry v. Lynaugh, 27 handed down just thirteen years earlier, to hold
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of defendants with
intellectual disabilities. 28 As with other death penalty exemption cases,
the Atkins Court determined that the "evolving standards of decency"
had shifted such that the execution of defendants with intellectual
disabilities constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 29
This Part will first detail the basics of the Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, looking at the consistency of its reasoning
in finding or rejecting death penalty exemptions. It will then examine
how Atkins differs from previous cases in granting states the power to
define the class of defendants constitutionally protected from the death
penalty by the Eighth Amendment. It will conclude by explaining how
the definitions chosen by the states are underinclusive, excluding from
Atkins's exception select defendants deserving of its protections.

27. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
28. The Court, beginning in 2014, began using the term "intellectual disability" over "mental
retardation," following the lead of professional organizations. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990 (citing DSM5, supranote 7, at 33).
29. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
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A. Objective Indicia and Independent Judgment
When deciding an Eighth Amendment question, the Court first
looks at "objective indicia" of the "evolving standards of decency" to
determine whether a punishment constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. The Court primarily examines state legislation as the
"clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary
values." 30 That is, when a state bars a certain punishment for a certain
class of defendants, the Court tallies that decision under "objective
indicia" to determine what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. If a sufficiently large number of states
ban a certain punishment for a certain class, the Court will take that
as evidence that the Eighth Amendment requires prohibition
nationally. 31
But the manner of actually counting states for this analysis is
hotly contested, and the raw number of states barring a punishment
rarely squares with how the Court counts those states for purpose of
establishing the objective indicia. In fact, the Court has invalidated
punishments still employed by up to thirty-seven states, far above the
one-half that the Eighth Amendment would seemingly allow. 3 2 In some
cases, the Court has done this by looking at actual state practices
instead of legislative pronouncements. 3 3 In other cases, the Court has
counted states that have abolished the death penalty entirely as
speaking to specific exemptions-for example, when the Court
abolished the death penalty for juveniles, it counted states that had
abolished the death penalty for all defendants together with those that
had abolished it only for juveniles in deciding that there was sufficient
agreement to make the juvenile exemption national. 34 In still other
cases, the Court has looked at the consistency and direction of change
instead of raw numbers of stateS 35 and has also considered a
particularly rapid speed of change as a factor in determining whether
the objective indicia indicate a change in the evolving standards of
decency. 3 6
Dissents, however, have objected to a death penalty exemption
when the punishment was employed by as few as six states-by
counting "undecided" states whose positions were insufficiently
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 312 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)).
Id.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010).
E.g., id.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 315.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2478 (2012).
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certain, 37 not counting abolitionist states in death penalty
exemptions,3 8 looking to whether state legislatures were "discouraged"
from writing new legislation by previous rulings, 39 finding too slow a
speed of change, 40 and arguing that the independent judgment is
dispositive irrespective of the objective indicia.4 1 In effect, the counting
of states is anything but objective-with so many methods of counting,
both sides of virtually any death penalty issue can find support in the
so-called objective indicia.
However, the Court does not end its Eighth Amendment
analysis here. After examining objective indicia, the Court uses its own
"independent judgment" to decide "whether there is reason to disagree
with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators." 4 2 While
the Court once looked to the degree of "moral depravity and . .. injury
to the person and to the public," 43 it has increasingly used its
independent judgment to examine whether the punishment
"measurably contributes" to the "two principal social purposes" of the
death penalty: retribution and deterrence. 44 The Court therefore
examines whether the class of defendants is culpable enough to deserve
the death penalty and deterrable enough for the death penalty to be
meaningful in preventing crime. The Court employed this framework
when it created an exemption for defendants under age sixteen, 45 the
intellectually disabled, 46 and juveniles.4 7

37. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2004 & n.5 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2004-05.
39. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 448 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting).
40. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 592 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 n.2 (1977)
(Powell, J., dissenting).
42. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002) (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 597); see also
Roper, 543 U.S. at 574 (holding that the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the Court's
independent judgment, and that stopping the analysis at the objective indicia is "inconsistent with
prior Eighth Amendment decisions").
Coker, 433 U.S. at 598.
43.
44. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
183 (1976)); see also Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Structure, Judicial Discretion, and the
Eighth Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2006) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment
embodies a broad delegation to the Court to exercise its own independent judgment about the
moral and penological propriety of capital punishment in various circumstances."); Meghan J.
Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 81, 101-02 (2010) ("[T]he Court most frequently
examines the penological justifications for specific punishments in forming its independent
judgment.").
45. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833-38 (1988).
46. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21.
47. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568-74 (2005).
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B. Clinical Definitions in Atkins
When the Court exempted the intellectually disabled from the
death penalty in Atkins, it followed the familiar two-part framework in
finding that both objective indicia and the Court's independent
judgment supported the exemption. However, Atkins differs from other
exemption cases in its definition of the class to which the prohibition
applies. Some previous exemption cases defined the class using age
limits, 4 8 whereas others held that commissions of particular crimes did
not impart sufficient culpability to impose the death penalty.49
Atkins, however, barred the execution of defendants with
intellectual disabilities, but left the definition of the class up to the
states.5 0 Unlike the age of the defendant or the crime charged,
intellectual disability does not refer to a class with readily determinable
members.5 1 Because no obvious bright-line rule was apparent, the
Court allowed the states to create their own definitions and gave tacit
approval to the definitions used by states that had already exempted
the intellectually disabled.52
Both the states that already exempted the intellectually
disabled from the death penalty and those required to do so by Atkins
largely adopted the clinical definitions of intellectual disability of the
APA and AAIDD, both groups' definitions having been cited
approvingly in Atkins itself.53 These definitions have three prongs.
First, the intellectual prong requires a defendant to have
"deficits in intellectual functions" that are "confirmed by both clinical
assessment and individualized, standardized intelligence testing." 54
This prong is typically measured by an intelligence test that produces

48. Id. at 571 (barringdeath penalty for juveniles); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (barring death
penalty for defendants under age sixteen).
49.
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420-21 (2008) (barring death penalty for child rape);
Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (barring death penalty for accomplice without intent to kill in felony
murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (barring death penalty for adult rape).
50. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317.
51. Id.:
To the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded
offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded.... Not all people who
claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally
retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus.
52.
See id. at 317 & n.22 ("The [states'] statutory definitions of mental retardation are not
identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions . . . ."); see also Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct.
1986, 1999 (2014) (noting that the Florida Supreme Court's newer reinterpretation of a Florida
statute cited by Atkins "runs counter to the clinical definition cited throughout Atkins").
53.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3. Atkins cites the AAIDD's former name, the American
Association of Mental Retardation ("AAMR"). Id.
54. DSM-5, supranote 7, at 33.
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an IQ score.55 An individual meets the intellectual prong by scoring
"approximately two standard deviations or more below the population
mean, including a margin for measurement error." 5 6 Taking into

account the SEM of a typical IQ test, this translates to a score below
the range of sixty-five to seventy-five.5 7
Second, the adaptive prong requires a defendant to have "deficits
in adaptive function that result in a failure to meet developmental and
socio-cultural standards for personal independence and social
responsibility."5 8 Adaptive deficits are grouped into three domains:
conceptual, social, and practical. An impairment in any one domain is
sufficient to meet the adaptive prong. Clinicians rely on "knowledgeable
informants . . [and] educational, developmental, medical, and mental
health evaluations" to establish this prong. 59 Finally, the age-of-onset
prong requires a defendant to have manifested both the intellectual and
adaptive deficits "during the developmental period," generally regarded
as before age eighteen.60
In adopting these definitions, states defined the class clinically
rather than legally. Unlike with legal terms of art like "premeditation,"
"appreciation of wrongfulness," or "inability to conform behavior,"
states defined intellectual disability by directly importing definitions
from professional organizations.61 This quirk in state adherence to the
requirements spelled out in Atkins meant that disagreements over the
definition of the intellectually disabled would continue.
C. Definitions Gone Awry
Adopting clinical definitions led to two problems. First, some
states adopted additional requirements, either imposing more
restrictive IQ requirements in the intellectual prong or providing
interpretive guidance in the adaptive prong that went beyond what
practitioners would consider. Second, the clinical definitions, developed
for diagnoses, are a poor fit for determining whether a particular
55. Id. at 37.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 33.
59. Id. at 33, 37-38; see DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7, at 41 (setting age-of-onset at age
eighteen). Because Atkins was decided while the DSM-IV-TR's age-eighteen requirement was
current, the states use age eighteen as the cutoff. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3
(2002) (describing APA and AAMR definitions, both including age-of-onset at eighteen years). But
see IND. CODE § 35-36-9-2 (2015) (setting Indiana's age-of-onset at twenty-two instead of eighteen).
60. DSM-5, supra note 7, at 33, 37.
61. Christopher Slobogin, Scientizing Culpability: The Implications of Hall v. Florida and
the Possibility of a "Scientific Stare Decisis,"23 WM. & MARY BiLL RTS. J. 415, 417 (2014).
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defendant is culpable enough to be put to death for a crime, thus leading
to underinclusive definitions of intellectual disability.
1. Additional Requirements
States have imposed additional requirements in two ways:
quantitative and qualitative. One group of states imposed quantitative
restrictions by disregarding the SEM and imposing a hard IQ cutoff at
seventy, thereby ending the inquiry when a defendant tested above that
number. 62 The APA and AAIDD both consider the SEM of IQ tests when
diagnosing a patient with intellectual disability and consequently look
for additional deficits in the adaptive prong when a patient presents an
IQ score in the seventy to seventy-five range. 63 States adopting the hard
IQ cutoff, however, disregard the SEM and, along with it, any need for
considering the adaptive prong when the defendant cannot prove an IQ
below seventy.64
Another quantitative restriction comes from how states consider
the "Flynn Effect." The Flynn Effect describes a phenomenon whereby
"the administration of older psychological tests will generally result in
higher test scores," thereby causing inflated scores if a defendant is
given an older test. 65 Although practitioners generally acknowledge the
effect, its use in Atkins hearings is controversial; some courts find it
clearly applicable if used by clinical professions, while others disregard
it entirely.6 6
Other states have imposed qualitative restrictions on
defendants asserting an Atkins defense. One such state, Texas, imposed
various restrictions in Ex parte Briseno when the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals found the adaptive prong "exceedingly subjective"
and too likely to result in experts of both parties providing confusingly
contradictory evidence. 67 The Briseno court therefore supplemented the
traditional three-prong clinical test with seven factors: (1) whether
others thought the defendant was intellectually disabled, (2) whether
the defendant formulated and carried through with plans, (3) whether
the defendant's conduct showed leadership, (4) whether the defendant's
62. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1996 (2014) (listing states with hard cutoffs).
63. See id. at 1994-95 (noting views of APA and AAIDD).
64. See id. at 1996 (describing the effect of disregarding SEM).
65. See Nancy Haydt, Intellectual Disability: A Digest of Complex Concepts in Atkins
Proceedings,CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2014, at 44, 44-45 (describing the Flynn Effect).
66. See, e.g., Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1138, 1170 (10th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the Flynn
Effect as having no scientific consensus and not mandated by Atkins); Walker v. True, 399 F.3d
315, 322-23 (4th Cir. 2005) (remanding a case for consideration of the Flynn Effect).
67. See Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (describing the additional
requirements).
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conduct in response to external stimuli was rational, (5) whether the
defendant could respond to questions coherently, (6) whether the
defendant could hide facts and lie effectively, and (7) whether the crime
required forethought or complex execution. 68
Texas's additional requirements, like the hard IQ cutoff, also
contradict clinical practice because they subject defendants to the death
penalty who meet clinical definitions of intellectual disability. The
adaptive prong is clinically met by showing adaptive deficits-not
adaptive strengths.6 9 The Briseno factors, however, worked to
disqualify a defendant from Atkins when he shows particular strengths
in an adaptive domain. Clinical definitions, by contrast, recognize the
possibility that a patient can have certain adaptive strengths while still
having an intellectual disability.7 0 Briseno therefore subjected to the
death penalty defendants who would have sufficient deficits to meet the
clinical adaptive prong. 71
2. The Underinclusiveness Problem
Even before Atkins made the intellectual disability exemption
national, scholars noted that the clinical definitions excluded
defendants of equal culpability. 72 One potential group affected by this
underinclusiveness problem is defendants suffering from serious
mental illness. Some scholars have advocated for applying the Atkins
rule to this group, pointing out that factors distinguishing the two
groups are often exaggerated. 73 For example, diagnoses of serious
mental illnesses are just as objective as those of intellectual disability. 74

68.

Id. at 8-9.

69.
ROBERT L. SCHALOCK ET AL., AAIDD USER'S GUIDE WORK GROUP, USER'S GUIDE TO
ACCOMPANY THE 11TH EDITION OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND

SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 26 (2012) (giving guidance on how to combat stereotypes of intellectual
disability, such as the idea that adaptive strengths cannot also be present); see also DSM-5, supra
note 7, at 33, 38.
70. DSM-5, supra note 7, at 33, 38.
71.

Stephen Greenspan, The Briseiio Factors, in THE DEATH PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL

DISABILITY 219, 219 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015).
72. Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 667, 667-69 (2000).
73. See Farahany, supra note 26, at 886 ("A number of medical conditions give rise to the
same cognitive, behavioral, and adaptive limitations the Court highlighted in Atkins."); Slobogin,
supra note 26, at 308-09 (identifying reasons for equating intellectual disability and mental
illness).
74. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002) (citing DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7, at
41) (defining intellectual disability); DSM-IV-TR, supranote 7, at 285; Slobogin, supranote 26, at
308 & n.106. Even in Atkins, the prosecution's expert testified that Atkins had "average
intelligence, at least," while the defendant's expert diagnosed Atkins with an intellectual
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The "adaptive functioning" component of intellectual disability involves
ambiguity in the same way that "delusions" and "hallucinations" could
in diagnosing serious mental illnesses. 5 Malingering, or "faking" a
condition, is not an especially serious concern-employing clinical tests
for malingering would be preferable to excluding the entire group from
consideration. 76 Contrary to such concerns raised in the Atkins dissent,
few defendants attempt to raise Atkins claims even when a meritorious
claim could be presented.7 7 Accordingly, there has always been little
risk of a system flooded with false Atkins claims. Serious mental illness
may also be as permanent a condition as intellectual disability,
particularly because the chronic nature of some forms of mental illness
and the rarity of complete remission suggest that serious mental
illnesses and intellectual disabilities can be equally permanent.7 8
These concerns about underinclusiveness are bolstered by
statements from professional organizations suggesting that clinical
definitions should not be used to assess criminal liability. The APA has
specifically cautioned against the use of its diagnostic categories in the
legal context.7 9 The APA wrote that its manual, the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM") was designed "for
clinical and research purposes" and its definitions "do[] not imply that
[a] condition meets legal or other nonmedical criteria for what
constitutes mental disease, mental disorder, or mental disability."80
The DSM further cautions that there are "significant risks that
diagnostic information will be misused . .. because of the imperfect fit
between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the
disability-showing how far diagnoses can differ in intellectual disability as well. See 536 U.S. at
308-09.
75.
Slobogin, supra note 26, at 308 & n.106 (" '[A]daptive functioning' is at least as
amorphous a term as 'delusion,' 'hallucination,' or 'disorganized speech.' ").
76. See Farahany, supra note 26, at 884 n. 141 (preferring tests of malingering for serious
mental illness over categorical exclusion).
77.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353-54 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (raising malingering concerns);
Denis W. Keyes & David Freedman, Retrospective Diagnosis and Malingering, in THE DEATH
PENALTY AND INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 263, 269 (Edward A. Polloway ed., 2015) ("Contrary to
Scalia's prophecy of a flood of new appeals, ... only approximately 7% of those inmates previously
sentenced to death ultimately raised claims in which they alleged that they had [intellectual
disability] and, consequently, were ineligible for execution.").
78.
Slobogin, supra note 26, at 308-09 ("As the DSM states, '[s]chizophrenia tends to be
chronic,' and '[c]omplete remission (i.e., a return to full premorbid functioning) is probably not
common.' (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DSM-IV-TR, supra
note 7, at 282)); see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 329 (1993) (suggesting permanence justifies
different treatment).
79.
See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7, at xxxii-xxxiii, xxxvii (highlighting the "imperfect fit
between the questions of ultimate concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical
diagnosis"); Farahany, supranote 26, at 886.
80. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7, at xxxvii.
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information contained in a clinical diagnosis."8 1 The APA supported this
reasoning when it recommended extending Atkins to defendants
suffering from certain serious mental illnesses at the time of the
offense, even if their illnesses do not fall within the diagnostic category
of intellectual disability. 82
Scholars have argued that this underinclusiveness means that
not extending Atkins's protections to defendants with serious mental
illness may violate the Equal Protection Clause.83 Although the
Supreme Court has never considered either persons with serious
mental illnesses or those with intellectual disabilities to be a "suspect
class" under the Equal Protection Clause, some precedent does indicate
that a higher standard of review than rational basis would apply,
making it more difficult for states to justify the use of potentially
underinclusive clinical definitions. 84
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court
purported to apply rational basis review, but still found
unconstitutional a city's ban on a group home for the intellectually
disabled.85 The Court justified finding the ban unconstitutional even
under such lax review because the city's actions were based on "an
irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded" and "mere negative
attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly
considered in a zoning proceeding." 86 However, such "negative
attitudes" have long been considered acceptable under rational basis
review, and rest on similar assumptions about the intellectually
disabled that justified the Atkins decision itself.87 This could suggest
that a higher level of scrutiny was actually being applied because the
ban targeted the intellectually disabled.88

81. Id. at xxxii-xxxiii. These points are repeated by the dissents in Hall and Moore, arguing
that the clinical definitions are overinclusive by noting the same "imperfect fit." Moore v. Texas,
No. 15-797, 2017 WL 1136278, at *22 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Hall v.
Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2006-07 (2014) (Alito, J., dissenting).
82.

REPORT ON RECOMMENDATION 122A, supra note 11, at 6-7 (noting, in a joint resolution

of the American Bar Association and the APA, reduced culpability of patients with "Axis I
diagnoses" such as "schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, mania, major depressive
disorder, and dissociative disorders-with schizophrenia being by far the most common disorder
seen in capital defendants"); AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N, supra note 11, at 3-4.
83. See Slobogin, supra note 26, at 298-303 (arguing that differences between defendants
with intellectual disabilities and those with serious mental illnesses are too small to overcome
equal protection scrutiny).
84. Id.
85. 473 U.S. 432, 442-50 (1985).
86. Id. at 448, 450.
87.
Slobogin, supra note 26, at 300.
88. Id.
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Other cases provide similar support for heightened scrutiny. In
Heller v. Doe, the Court purported to apply rational basis review in a
case on the differences in standard of proof for commitment of
individuals with serious mental illnesses and those with intellectual
disabilities.8 9 Yet, even though the argument for a higher standard was
not presented in the lower courts, the Court proceeded to give reasons
for the law that would have nevertheless survived a higher standard
anyway. 90 And in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett, only three members of the Court unequivocally stated that
rational basis was the correct standard for cases involving the
intellectually disabled. 91
One last case suggests that the implication of Eighth
Amendment rights against freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment might also serve to elevate the standard of review. In
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the Court suggested that the
right to procreate was fundamental and on that basis applied strict
scrutiny and found unconstitutional an Oklahoma law that called for
the sterilization of defendants convicted of larceny, but not for those
convicted of embezzlement. 92 The Court noted that the only difference
between larceny and embezzlement in Oklahoma was "'with reference
to the time when the fraudulent intent to convert the property' . .
arises"93 and that upholding the law on "such conspicuously artificial
lines" would make the Equal Protection Clause a mere "formula of
empty words." 94 One scholar has suggested that the Supreme Court's

line of death penalty jurisprudence post-Gregg declaring that "death is
different," 95 along with Skinner's application of strict scrutiny for an
apparent fundamental right, could indicate that death penalty
classifications are already being analyzed under a higher level of
scrutiny than rational basis. 96
Nonetheless, attempts to extend Atkins to defendants with a
serious mental illness have been unanimously rejected by state courts.
Some of these courts have held that serious mental illness is not well
enough defined, or has too many forms, to be comparable to intellectual

89.
509 U.S. 312, 317-19 (1993).
90.
Id. at 319-22; Slobogin, supra note 26, at 301-02 (analyzing the court's reasoning).
91.
531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001); id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Slobogin, supra note 26,
at 302-03 (noting the differences between the majority and concurring opinions).
92.
316 U.S. 535, 536-37, 541-42 (1942).
93. Id. at 541-42 (quoting Riley v. State, 78 P.2d 712, 715 (Okla. Crim. App. 1938)).
94. Id. at 542.
95.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)
96.
Farahany, supra note 26, at 904-05.
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disability. 97 These states generally find that, although some defendants
with a serious mental illness would be "utterly unable to control their
behavior" and therefore "lack the extreme culpability associated with
capital punishment," no consensus exists on how to define the class that
would fit within that exemption. 98 Another common rationale espoused
by state courts is that serious mental illness does not impact culpability
as severely as intellectual disability. 99 Courts holding this state that
defendants with a serious mental illness do not categorically possess
culpability equal to or less than that of defendants with intellectual
disabilities.10 0 Finally, some courts reject the extension of Atkins to
serious mental illness as unsupported by case law. 101 These states find
that, without a trend among the states reflecting objective indicia of the
evolving standards of decency, Atkins cannot cover defendants with a
serious mental illness. 102
A second group affected by the underinclusiveness problem is
defendants who suffer deficits in both the intellectual and adaptive
prongs, but whose deficits manifested after age eighteen. Because
clinical definitions require the onset of symptoms to occur before that
age, this requirement leads to the exclusion of defendants with identical
deficits at the time of the offense based solely on when in their lives
those deficits began.
Several medical conditions can cause deficits that meet the first
two Atkins prongs by affecting "cognition, communication, mental
97. See People v. Boyce, 330 P.3d 812, 852-53 (Cal. 2014) (refusing, in a unanimous decision,
to extend Atkins because of the supposed incoherence associated with mental illness); Lawrence v.
State, 969 So.2d 294, 300 n.9 (Fla. 2007) (per curiam) (rejecting summarily an extension of Atkins);
State v. Anderson, 996 So.2d 973, 987-88 (La. 2008) (claiming that the group of people with serious
mental illness "is far more diffuse and much harder to define" than the class of people who are
intellectually disabled); State v. Hancock, 840 N.E.2d 1032, 1059-60 (Ohio 2006) (declining to
extend Atkins based on the many different forms of mental illness).
98. Boyce, 330 P.3d at 852 (quoting People v. Hajek, 324 P.3d 88, 174 (Cal. 2014)).
99.
See Lawrence, 969 So.2d at 300 n.9 (rejecting defendant's argument that mental illness
reduces culpability in the same way as intellectual disability); Hancock, 840 N.E.2d at 1059
(claiming a lack of evidence that mental illness reduces culpability to the same extent as
intellectual disability); Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (unanimous
decision) ("[A]ppellant has failed to show that, if he did suffer from some mental impairment at
the time of these murders, that impairment was so severe that he is necessarily and categorically
less morally culpable than those who are not mentally ill.").
100. See Hancock, 840 N.E.2d at 1059 (questioning whether those with a serious mental
illness are "comparable to a mentally retarded person with respect to reasoning, judgment, and
impulse control").
101. See Dickerson v. State, No. 2012-DP-01500-SCT, 2015 WL 3814618, at *6-7 (Miss. June
18, 2015) (citing Fifth Circuit cases rejecting an extension of Atkins); Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 379
(citing numerous cases from other state and federal courts refusing to extend Atkins's prohibition
to mentally ill defendants).
102. See, e.g., Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 379-80 (pointing to the absence of a trend among the states
as support for its decision not to extend Atkins).
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health and behavior, judgment, and adaptive skills," yet can arise after
age eighteen. 103 These include traumatic brain injury, dementia,
epilepsy, and bacterial meningitis. 1 0 4 The APA definition of major and
mild neurocognitive disorders, like its definition of intellectual
disability, includes an examination of cognitive and adaptive
functioning.10 5 However, unlike intellectual disability, neurocognitive
disorders have no necessary restriction on age, meaning that a patient
with a disorder such as traumatic brain injury might be diagnosed with
a neurocognitive disorder rather than an intellectual disability simply
because of the age-of-onset requirement. 106 Such a person would be
eligible for the death penalty, while a similar defendant whose onset
occurred before age eighteen would not.
Few justifications exist for excluding defendants purely because
of age of onset. The same triggering events can cause intellectual and
adaptive deficits regardless of the age of onset, so there is no necessary
difference between the groups with respect to underlying conditions. 107
While setting the cutoff age at eighteen may provide a bright-line rule,
the age at impairment does not impact whether a defendant can "(i)
understand and process information; (ii) communicate; (iii) learn from
experience; (iv) reason logically; (v) control impulses; and (vi)
understand the reactions of others," so the age-of-onset requirement
gives "no help at all in determining whose mental deficits ...
interfere[] with retribution, deterrence, and prospects for a fair
trial . ... "108 There is therefore no culpability-based rationale that
appears to justify such a rule. Even apart from culpability concerns, the
age-of-onset requirement complicates fact-finding when relevant
medical records before age eighteen are either absent or incomplete,
necessitating an often-contested retrospective diagnosis and can

103. See Farahany, supranote 26, at 887 (comparing the deficits of intellectual disability with
those of other medical conditions).
104. Id. Louisiana explicitly names and excludes defendants with "[t]raumatic brain damage
occurring after age eighteen" from Atkins protection. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1
(H1)(2)(s) (2014).
105. See DSM-5, supra note 7, at 602-07 (describing the cognitive component of
neurocognitive disorders as standard deviations from the mean and the functional component as
reduced independence in everyday activities).
106. See id. (describing no age-of-onset requirement for neurocognitive disorders).
107. See Mulroy, supra note 12, at 647 ("[A]s a factual, medical matter, young-onset
[intellectual disability] and adult-onset [intellectual disability] may not differ as to relative
permanence as much as one might think.").
108. Id. at 644 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002)).
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potentially make the age-of-onset prong the most difficult of the three,
even though it appears to be the most objective. 109
Attempts in state courts to challenge the age-of-onset prong
have had as little success as challenges to expand Atkins to serious
mental illness. These cases allow courts to require an IQ test before age
eighteen, holding that postdevelopmental IQ tests and circumstantial
evidence are insufficient to meet the age-of-onset requirement.1 1 0 Such
circumstantial evidence has included placement in special education
classes, reading at a second-grade level as an adult, scoring below
seventy-five on a postdevelopmental IQ test, and reports from family
and other witnesses of the defendant's condition prior to age eighteennone of which, according to those courts, can be used as evidence of
intellectual disability. 1I

One case is particularly noteworthy for demonstrating the
evidentiary problems presented by the age-of-onset prong. In Ybarra v.
State,112 the defendant had been diagnosed with delusions,
hallucinations, organic personality disorder, depression, and bipolar
disorder, but not an intellectual disability; the closest the defendant got

109. See Van Tran v. State, No. W2005-01334-CCA-R3-PD, 2006 WL 3327828, at *26 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Nov. 9, 2006) (rejecting intellectual disability diagnosis for lack of developmental
period IQ test); Mulroy, supra note 12, at 645-46, 646 n.371 ("[Iln many cases ... like Van Tran's,
the onset requirement may be the most difficult to determine."); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (suggesting that difficulty of antisocial personality disorder diagnosis in
patients under eighteen formed part of justification for juvenile exemption); Ybarra v. State, 247
P.3d 269, 277-80 (Nev. 2011) (discussing a complicated retrospective diagnosis at issue); AM. ASS'N
ON INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL

DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION,

CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 95-96 (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD] (detailing
guidelines and factors clinicians should follow when making retrospective diagnosis for legal and
other nonmedical purposes).
110. See, e.g., Stallings v. Bagley, 561 F. Supp. 2d 821, 884 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (finding a
"paucity of evidence" for the defendant to meet the onset requirement because of an absence of
developmental intelligence testing); Williams v. Cahill, 303 P.3d 532, 538-40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013)
(rejecting the use of interviews with past acquaintances to meet the onset requirement); State v.
Anderson, 996 So.2d 973, 987-88 (La. 2008) (discussing the age-of-onset requirement under
Louisiana law); Ybarra, 247 P.3d at 277-80 (stressing the significance of lack of intelligence testing
during the developmental period); Commonwealth v. VanDivner, 962 A.2d 1170, 1185-86 (Pa.
2009) (upholding a finding that the onset requirement was not met because, among other reasons,
a developmental IQ test had not been performed); Van Tran, 2006 WL 3327828, at *26 ('The
evidence of poverty, child abuse, lack of education, family dysfunction and poor social conditions
are not enough to demonstrate that any deficits manifested during the developmental period.").
111. See Stallings, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 882-84 (finding special education and low reading
proficiency insufficient and postdevelopmental-period IQ test irrelevant); Williams, 303 P.3d at
537-39 (finding a postdevelopmental-period IQ test insufficient because deteriorating mental
condition suggested a higher IQ at an earlier age, and family witnesses were too unreliable);
VanDivner, 962 A.2d at 1184-85 (holding placement in special education classes and reading at a
second grade level insufficient). But see AAIDD, supra note 109, at 95-96 (discussing possibility of
retrospective diagnosis using witness recollections and school records other than formal IQ tests).
112. 247 P.3d 269 (Nev. 2011).
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was a psychiatrist's diagnosis during his developmental period that he
was "intellectually challenged." 113 The defendant had a significant head
injury at age nine, scored a sixty on a postdevelopmental period IQ test,
and was in and out of employment and the military. 114 However, the
prosecution's expert concluded the defendant was malingering, another
postdevelopmental period IQ test returned a score of eighty-six
(although multiple issues made this score suspect), military records did
not indicate the defendant was intellectually disabled, and the IQ test
on which the defendant scored a sixty came with a disclaimer that, due
to the stress that the testing caused, the score "may underestimate [the
defendant's] actual intelligence functioning."1 15 The Nevada Supreme
Court held that the district court was not unreasonable in concluding
that the defendant had failed to prove intellectual disability by a
preponderance because his deficits were not shown to have occurred
before age eighteen. 11 6 Relying on approaches taken by the APA,
AAIDD, and other jurisdictions, the Ybarra court determined that the
age cutoff of eighteen years best served the "twofold" purpose of the ageof-onset requirement because it (i) ensures that defendants with
postdevelopment injuries or conditions are excluded and (ii) prevents
those charged with a capital crime from malingering."
States requiring clear evidence to meet the age-of-onset
requirement give several reasons for rejecting pre-developmentalperiod evidence. One court speculated on alternative meanings to each
piece of evidence suggesting intellectual disability, hypothesizing that
placement in special education class could be for behavioral reasons and
that poor academic performance could be the result of tardiness. 118
Another explained that postdevelopmental-period IQ tests were not
sufficient evidence because of the defendant's deteriorating mental
condition, which meant that the low IQ score later in life might not have
accurately reflected the defendant's IQ at age eighteen. 119
Many courts, however, simply point to clinical definitions. When
confronted with a defendant who had no access to IQ testing while in
school, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court simply referred to the APA
and AAIDD definitions cited in Atkins that require onset before age
eighteen, without considering the possibility of a retrospective
113. Id. at 277.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 278-80.
116. Id. at 283-84.
117. Id. at 275-76.
118. See Commonwealth v. VanDivner, 962 A.2d 1170, 1184-85 (Pa. 2009) (upholding such
speculation by the lower court).
119. Williams v. Cahill ex rel. County of Pima, 303 P.3d 532, 538 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013).
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diagnosis-even though those organizations allow for them. 120 Another
court candidly admitted the absurdity of the age-of-onset prong, but
applied it anyway, writing:
A normal 16-year-old who suffers traumatic brain damage in an automobile accident may
receive a diagnosis of mental retardation while a normal 18-year-old who suffers the same
damage in a similar manner may not, although the degree of impairment in intellectual
functioning and adaptive skills may be identical in both instances. 121

On the other hand, one court explicitly rejected clinical definitions when
it looked to adaptive strengths to exclude a finding of intellectual
disability, contradicting clinical definitions. 1 2 2 That court admitted that
it departed from clinical definitions because state law "'requires an
overall assessment of the defendant's ability to meet society's
expectations of him,' not 'proof of specific deficits.' "123
Ultimately, the decision in Atkins to leave definitions to the
states, and the subsequent use of clinical definitions, led to two
problematic ways in which states excluded defendants from the
guarantee supposedly given in Atkins. Some states modified those
definitions to set higher standards for defendants seeking to prove
intellectual disability, while others stubbornly adhered to them to allow
the death penalty for defendants technically falling outside of clinical
definitions based on age of onset but who possessed equal culpability as
defendants protected under Atkins.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH HALL AND MOORE
More than a decade after Atkins, the Supreme Court returned to
the issue when it invalidated aspects of state definitions of intellectual
disability in Hall v. Florida and Moore v. Texas. 1 2 4 Although each
decision purported to clarify the bounds of state liberty to define
intellectual disability with respect to Atkins, they provided only vague
guidance on what additional requirements, if any, states were still
allowed to impose.

120. VanDioner, 962 A.2d at 1186-87 (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n.3, 318
(2002)).
121. State v. Anderson, 996 So.2d 973, 988 (La. 2008).
122. See Williams, 303 P.3d at 541 (distinguishing Arizona's statutory definition from clinical
definitions).
123. Id. (quoting State v. Grell, 135 P.3d 696, 709 (Ariz. 2006)).
124. Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, 2017 WL 1136278 at *4 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2017); Hall v. Florida,
134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
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A. The Problems Hall Solved?
In 2014, the Court in Hall v. Floridaaddressed the problem of
additional requirements, invalidating Florida's hard IQ cutoff of
seventy because clinical definitions incorporate the SEM into IQ tests,
allowing for scores up to seventy-five to qualify for an intellectual
disability diagnosis with additional adaptive deficits. 12 5
On its face, Hall invalidated the strict IQ cutoffs used by Florida
and other states in deciding which defendants meet the intellectual
prong of intellectual disability. Although both the extent to which states
must follow clinical definitions and the reasons why they must do so
remain murky, it was at least clear from Hall that strict IQ cutoffs were
inconsistent with Atkins. 12 6 However, the Court's emphasis on the
importance of clinical definitions has uncertain application outside the
precise facts of the case.
Hall stated that clinical definitions were a "fundamental
premise of Atkins" and that the Atkins decision never gave "unfettered
discretion to define the full scope of the constitutional protection." 12 7
However, Hall did concede that Atkins "did not provide definitive
procedural or substantive guides for determining" the appropriate
definitions-even though Atkins gave "substantive guidance on the
definition of intellectual disability." 12 8
In interpreting these seemingly contradictory statements,
circuit courts unsurprisingly disagree on Hall's meaning. The Seventh
Circuit determined that "the Supreme Court again declined to set forth
a legal definition of intellectual disability." 129 The Sixth Circuit took the
exact opposite approach, stating, "In Hall, the Court reasoned that the
Constitution requires the courts and legislatures to follow clinical
practices in defining intellectual disability." 13 0 The Ninth Circuit
partially agreed with the Sixth, but claimed that Hall merely took note
of the national consensus on applying clinical definitions. 1 3 1 Meanwhile,
125. 134 S. Ct. at 2000 ("[A]n individual with an IQ test score 'between 70 and 75 or lower,'
may show intellectual disability by presenting additional evidence regarding difficulties in
adaptive functioning." (citations omitted) (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S.at 309 n.5)).
126. Id. at 1998 ("The Atkins Court twice cited definitions of intellectual disability which, by
their express terms, rejected a strict IQ test score cutoff at 70.").
127. Id. at 1998-99.
128. Id. (quoting Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 831 (2009)).
129. Pruitt v. Neal, 788 F.3d 248, 264 (7th Cir. 2015).
130. Van Tran v. Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 612 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added).
131. See Smith v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 1175, 1204 (9th Cir. 2016) ("In Hall v. Florida,however, the
Court held that, contrary to what the state courts and our own court had thought, Atkins set forth
a substantive definition of intellectual disability encompassing those aspects of the clinical
definition about which a national consensus exists." (citations omitted)).
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the Fifth Circuit largely confines Hall to its facts, stating that it only
bars IQ cutoffs without considering its application to other aspects of
clinical definitions. 13 2
B. The Problems with PotentialSolutions to Hall
Several attempts have been made to resolve the apparent
contradiction in Hall's statements in order to discover what "fetters"
guides,"
Atkins placed on the states without providing "definitive . .
while still upholding clinical definitions as a "fundamental premise."
These attempts fall into two categories: either Hall imposes an absolute
requirement to use clinical definitions-as mostly clearly proposed by
the Hall dissent and the Sixth Circuit-or Hall merely forbids a state
from using IQ cutoffs to restrict the introduction of further evidence of
intellectual disability, as proposed by the Fifth Circuit.
1. Hall Dissent and Sixth Circuit
The Hall dissent and Sixth Circuit characterize Hall as an
absolute requirement to use clinical definitions. Justice Alito wrote in
his dissent that Atkins explicitly left definitions of intellectual disability
up to the states because of the "'serious disagreement' among the States
with respect to the best method for 'determining which offenders are in
fact [intellectually disabled].' "133 The dissent further noted that
shifting clinical definitions of professional organizations would cause
practical issues in the majority's approach.134 These issues include
which organizations to follow, how to handle updated or rescinded
definitions, and whether any judicial scrutiny would apply to new
changes.1 35 In making these comments, the dissent construed the Hall
holding as requiring adherence to clinical definitions in every respect,
not just IQ scores.
Justice Alito's view of Hall is shared by the Sixth Circuit, which
stated that the Supreme Court "reasoned that the Constitution requires
the courts and legislatures to follow clinical practices in defining
intellectual disability."1 36 The Sixth Circuit in Van Tran v. Colson
claimed that Hall instructs courts that "[s]ociety relies upon medical
and professional expertise to define and explain how to diagnose the
132. Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 217-18 (5th Cir. 2014) ("[Hall] exclusively addresses
the constitutionality of mandatory, strict IQ test cutoffs.").
133. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2003 (Alito, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 2005-07.
135. Id.
136. Van Tran v. Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 612 (6th Cir. 2014).
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mental condition at issue." 13 7 The Van Tran court therefore concluded
that additional factors, beyond those considered by clinicians in making
a diagnosis, should not be considered by a trial court when determining
whether a defendant has an intellectual disability. 138
This view comprehensively solves the first Atkins problem
identified above: the additional requirements states imposed on
defendants. However, the approach does nothing to resolve the
underinclusiveness problem, especially given that it would allow states
to continue imposing the age-eighteen cutoff under the age-of-onset
prong and thereby limit what evidence a defendant could present.
The Sixth Circuit attempted to resolve the evidentiary problems
behind this view in Williams v. Mitchell.1 39 There, the court decided, per
clinical definitions, "that intellectual disability manifests itself before
eighteen and remains consistent throughout a person's life." 140
Williams therefore determined that post-age-eighteen evidence of
intellectual and adaptive deficits was acceptable evidence because the
unchanging nature of intellectual disability meant that the condition
post-eighteen would be identical to that pre-eighteen.
While this view would appear to solve the underinclusiveness
problem, its focus on the unchanging nature of intellectual disability is
misleading. In the example of intellectual disability caused by dementia
or traumatic brain injury, it would not be true that post-eighteen
clinical assessments would be evidence of pre-eighteen deficits. The
Sixth Circuit approach therefore only helps those defendants who
simply lacked pre-eighteen evidence, not those whose deficits actually
began after age eighteen.
The Sixth Circuit view also has a more fundamental problem: it
directly contradicts statements made in Hall about Atkins. While Hall
may have required more adherence to clinical definitions, it reiterated
that states "play a critical role in ...
providing the Court with
information that contributes to an understanding of how intellectual
disability should be measured and assessed." 141 The Court did not go so
far as to require strict adherence; it merely pushed states in that
direction, stating that the "legal determination of intellectual disability
is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical
community's diagnostic framework." 142 Rather, in Hall's own terms, it

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1993).
Id.
792 F.3d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 621.
Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998.
Id. at 2000 (emphasis added).
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merely denied to the states the ability "to define the full scope of the
constitutional protection." 14 3 Accordingly, Hall did not purport to
completely restrain the states and continued to "not provide definitive
procedural or substantive guides." 144
2. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit takes a different approach to Hall, largely
constraining it to its facts and allowing states to impose additional
requirements. In Mays v. Stephens, the Fifth Circuit determined that
Hall did not forbid Texas from using the Briseno factors, thus
continuing to allow Briseno's "guidance" to supplement the normal
three-prong test for intellectual disability. 145
The Mays court interpreted the ruling in Hall as limited to IQ
cutoffs, inapplicable to the "non-diagnostic" factors like those created
by Briseno.146 It characterized the IQ cutoff as a "prohibition of
sentencing courts' considering even substantial, additional evidence of
retardation" because the IQ cutoff in the intellectual prong served as a
threshold matter for determining intellectual disability. 147 Mays found
the cutoff issue "problematic largely because it restricted the evidence"
and determined that the Briseno factors were unaffected by Hall
because they "merely provide further guidance to sentencing courts as
to what kinds of evidence the court might consider when determining
adaptive functioning." 148 The Mays court therefore found the "reasoning
animating Hall" to be the evidence-restricting nature of the hard IQ
cutoff as a threshold matter when that cutoff was contrary to
established clinical practice. 149
This approach has two problems. First, Mays's interpretation of
Hall as an evidentiary rule is merely an artifact of having a three-prong
test; under a hard-cutoff system, a defendant that loses on the first
prong would be barred from presenting evidence on the other prongs
because that evidence would no longer be probative on the issue, not
because any special evidentiary rule bars it.150 Accordingly, most courts
143. Id. at 1998 (emphasis added).
144. Id. (quoting Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825, 831 (2009)).
145. Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 218 (5th Cir. 2014).
146. Id. (citing Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994 ("That strict IQ test score cutoff of 70 is the issue in
this case.")).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See id. ("Because this cutoff did not take into account the well-known imprecision of IQ
testing, the Court was wary of any blanket restriction on a defendant's ability to present further
evidence of his disability.").
150. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (irrelevant evidence); FED. R. EVID. 403 (unnecessary evidence).
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prior to Hall that found against a defendant on the intellectual prong
did not continue the analysis into the adaptive prong. 15 1 Second, the
reasoning behind Hall rejects a purely evidentiary view. It was clinical
practice, not rules of evidence, that persuaded the Court that states
must consider evidence of adaptive deficits even when the defendant
scored above seventy on an IQ test. 152 The Hall Court's strong
references to the importance of clinical practice conflicts with the Fifth
Circuit's easy conclusion that Hall is inapplicable to the Briseno factors.
Neither of the approaches described above are satisfactory. Both
deviate from clear statements made in Hall, and neither solve the
underinclusiveness problem. Therefore, a new solution that adheres to
all of Hall's requirements, along with solving both the additional
requirements and underinclusiveness problems, was needed. When the
Court revisited the issue of clinical definitions in 2017, however, it
provided little more clear guidance toward a solution than it did in Hall.
C. One Moore Problem Solved?

In March 2017, the Supreme Court again ruled on the use of
clinical definitions in Moore v. Texas. 153 Moore held that the Briseno
factors and the other additional requirements imposed by Texas were
violations of the Eighth Amendment by "disregard[ing] . . . current

medical standards." 15 4 Moore relied heavily on the importance of clinical
practices, stating outright that "[t]he medical community's current
standards supply one constraint on States' leeway in this area" because
''current manuals offer 'the best available description of how mental
disorders are expressed and can be recognized by trained clinicians.' "155
This reliance was harshly criticized by the dissent, which claimed the

151. In one study of Atkins claim rejections, researchers found that "approximately 31% of all
unsuccessful cases were considered a loss on Prong 1 [intellectual prong] only," and that "[i]n most
of these cases, the decision . . . contained little or no specific discussion of the evidence relevant to
the other two prongs of the intellectual disability criterion," noting that only three of fifty-five
losses contained any discussion of the second prong. John H. Blume et al., A Tale of Two (and
Possibly Three) Atkins: Intellectual Disability and Capital Punishment Twelve Years after the
Supreme Court's Creationof a CategoricalBar, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 393, 400-01 (2014).
152. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2001 (2014) ("It is not sound to view a single factor as
dispositive of a conjunctive and interrelated assessment.").
153. No. 15-797, 2017 WL 1136278 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2017).
154. Id. at *4, *9.
155. Id. at *14 (citing DSM-5, supranote 7, at xli).
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majority opinion "abandons the usual mode of analysis this Court has
employed in Eighth Amendment cases." 156
Moore first held that Texas did not properly account for the
standard error of measurement in finding that the defendant did not
have intellectual deficits under the first prong of Atkins, the same error
made by Florida in Hall. 157 The Court held that, because Moore scored
a seventy-four, the state court was required to move on to the adaptive
prong of Atkins even if other testimony suggested that Moore likely
scored within the high end of the range of sixty-nine to seventy-nine
(the five-score range of the SEM). 15 8
Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals went on to
consider the adaptive prong as an alternative holding, Moore reversed
it there as well. Moore held that Texas "overemphasized" the
defendant's adaptive strengths and change in behavior while in prison
because "the medical community focuses the adaptive-functioning
inquiry on adaptive deficits" and avoids making judgments based on
behavior in a "controlled setting" such as prison. 159 It then noted two
other factors Texas considered, the defendant's traumatic experiences
and coexisting conditions, that the state improperly interpreted as
evidence against intellectual disability, when medical standards
considered them "risk factors" (i.e., factors that should have supported
a finding of intellectual disability). 16 0
Moore then criticized and ultimately struck down Texas's use of
the Briseno factors for evaluating adaptive functioning. The Court held
that those factors "[b]y design and in operation" created an
"unacceptable risk" that defendants with milder forms of intellectual
disability would be executed, even though Atkins protects the "entire
category" of intellectually disabled defendants. 161 Because Atkins
protects the entire group, Texas was not allowed to limit the group to
the subcategory of the "Texas citizens' consensus" on "who 'should be
exempted from the death penalty.' "162
The Court found that those factors were "an invention of [Texas]
untied to any acknowledged source" and held that the Briseno factors
"may not be used, as [Texas] used them, to restrict qualification of an

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at *16 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at *10-11 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *12.
Id.
Id. (quoting Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)).
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individual as intellectually disabled." 163 Finally, Moore found that the
objective indicia supported striking down the Briseno factors-although
it made no mention of objective indicia with respect to other Texas
practices, like considering prison behavior or coexisting conditions. 164
Because the Briseno factors enjoyed the support of no state legislatures
and only two other state courts, the objective indicia indicated that the
Briseno factors were an "outlier." 165
1. What to Follow, What to Disregard
On its face, Moore purports to uphold the same balance as stated
in Hall on how closely states must follow clinical definitions. It
explained that "[e]ven if 'the views of medical experts' do not 'dictate' a
court's intellectual-disability determination . .. the determination must
be 'informed by the medical community's diagnostic framework.' "166 It
then explained that "being informed" "does not demand adherence to
everything stated in the latest medical guide. But neither does our
precedent license disregard of current medical standards." 167
The Moore dissent noted the lack of guidance on how far to take
prohibiting "disregard" of such standards. 168 The dissent noted that the
majority could not mean "disregard" as in "dismiss as unworthy of
attention," as Texas took note of those standards while choosing to
follow others. 169 The dissent found other guidance from the Court
equally unhelpful in resolving how much freedom states retain in
establishing working definitions of intellectual disability.170 For
instance, it noted that the Court's instruction to read its precedents to
not "diminish the force of the medical community's consensus" 171 was
just as vague as its requirements for states to "be[ ] informed" and not
"disregard the views of medical professionals." 17 2
While the dissent's only proposed conception of "disregard" was
not consistent with the majority opinion, working through each possible
meaning in light of the majority opinion and of Hall and Atkins provides
163. Id. at *4.
164. Id. at *13.
165. Id. The dissent agreed that the Briseno factors were unconstitutional, but only because
of the objective indicia. Id. at *24 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
166. Id. at *9 (majority opinion) (quoting Hall v. Florida, 134 S.Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at *22 (Roberts, C., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at *4 (majority opinion).
172. Id. at *9; id. at *23 (Roberts, C., dissenting).
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insight into what command Moore might offer to the states. First,
Moore might have meant that states must consider all factors used by
medical standards in creating a definition of intellectual disability. This
hypothesis quickly fails: even if Texas had considered everything in the
DSM-5, its extra consideration of the nonclinical Briseno factors were
held invalid. 173
Second, Moore might instead have intended that states may
consider only factors used in clinical definitions, and nothing else. This
appears too extreme in the other direction: it would contradict
instructions in Hall and Moore that states still retain some role in
defining intellectual disability. 174 Moore itself reiterated that "Hall
indicated that being informed by the medical community does not
demand adherence to everything stated in the latest medical guide." 175

One final hypothesis could be that states must interpret
evidence consistently with medical standards. This theory would well
explain the invalidation of how Texas regarded traumatic experiences
and coexisting conditions; while Texas weighed those against a finding
of intellectual disability, medical standards count them as risk
factors. 176 However, this hypothesis does little to explain how the Court
would rule on wholly nonclinical factors like those presented in Briseno.
It is therefore clear that the most straightforward
interpretations of Moore's prohibiting "disregard" of medical standards
are insufficient to explain either the specific holding of Moore or the
Court's larger trajectory of cases on clinical definitions of intellectual
disability. However, Moore did suggest another method of reasoning
that may shed light on its meaning: risk analysis.
2. Risk as an Eighth Amendment Issue
When invalidating the Briseno factors, Moore held that because
they were "[n]ot aligned with the medical community's information"
and "draw[ ] no strength from our precedent," the Briseno factors
"creat[e] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability
will be executed."17 7
173. See id. at *4 (majority opinion) (overruling Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004)).
174. Id. at *9 (stating that it "does not demand adherence to everything stated in the latest
medical guide"); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1999 (2014) (noting that Atkins left'to the States
the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction' ") (quoting Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002)).
175. 2017 WL 1136278, at *9.
176. Id. at *12.
177. Id. at *4 (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990).
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Risk holds a particularly special place in Moore's analysis, and
does so in a subtly different context than previous cases concerning risk
and the death penalty. A brief examination of those cases reveals the
evolution of death penalty risk, how Hall addressed it in a new way,
and why risk is central to the holding in Moore.
Cases prior to Hall discussed the danger of risk in terms of
executing an individual not sufficiently culpable to deserve that
penalty. Beginning with Gregg v. Georgia, the Court was concerned
with the risk of "arbitrary and capricious" decisions at sentencing. 178
Other cases pre-Atkins share this concern. In Booth v. Maryland, the
Court held that victim impact statements were irrelevant to sentencing
decisions in capital trials and therefore "create[ ] a constitutionally
unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty in an
arbitrary and capricious manner." 179 In Caldwell v. Mississippi,
misleading statements to the jury on the nature of appellate review
were held to "creat[e] an unacceptable risk that 'the death penalty [may
have been] meted out arbitrarily or capriciously.' "180 This early concern
with risk was therefore focused on what evidence introduced at
sentencing would increase the risk of arbitrary or capricious decisions
by the jury.
When Atkins addressed risk, however, it instead used language
from Lockett v. Ohio, which concerned "[t]he risk that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty." 18 1 Atkins then listed several disadvantages that defendants
with intellectual disabilities face, including "the lesser ability .

.

. to

make a persuasive showing of mitigation," being "less able to give
meaningful assistance to their counsel," being "poor witnesses," and
having a "demeanor [that] may create an unwarranted impression of
lack of remorse. . . ."182 In doing so, the Court did not characterize these
reasons as being wholly "arbitrary," but nonetheless noted that
intellectually disabled defendants "in the aggregate face a special risk
of wrongful execution." 18 3

178. 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
179. 482 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
180. 472 U.S. 320, 343 (1985) (quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 999 (1983)). Other
cases continued to address this concern, even when not ultimately granting relief. See, e.g.,
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 323 (1987) (noting that the "emphasis on risk" highlighted the
difficulty of determining any individual jury's reasoning for a death sentence).
181. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605
(1978)).
182. Id. at 320-21.
183. Id. at 321.
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But Atkins did not mean "wrongful" in the sense that
intellectually disabled defendants might face death for crimes they did
not commit. Rather, they might face execution when the factors,
properly considered, weigh against it, even though the decision was not
"arbitrary." 184 Although this modified the previous conception of "risk,"
it was still well within the Court's decisions requiring only the most
culpable offenders to be subject to the death penalty. 185
The problem the Court faced in Hall involved a different type of
risk, arising because of Atkins's ill-defined class of defendants
categorically exempt from the death penalty.1 8 6 Because the category of
persons protected by Atkins is so difficult to define, there arose a
separate risk that intellectually disabled defendants would not be
excluded by restrictive state definitions of intellectual disability. 187 Hall
confronted that problem head-on when it determined that Florida's
strict IQ cutoff "create[d] an unacceptable risk that persons with
intellectual
disability
will
be executed,
and thus
[was]
constitutional." 188 Because Atkins had provided Eighth Amendment
protections to all intellectually disabled defendants, the new risk Hall
addressed was that of individuals being excluded because of state
definitions. 189
The Court's death penalty cases have thus established three
types of risk. The first, Gregg risk, addresses arbitrary and capricious
death sentences. The second, Atkins risk, is the concern that juries will
not properly weigh factors for and against sentencing a certain
individual to death, possibly finding that factor weighs in favor of
execution when the Court believes it should weigh against it. The final
type, Hall risk, is the danger that a defendant within a categorically
exempt group will nonetheless be executed. In all of these opinions,
however, the usual Eighth Amendment analysis of objective indicia and
independent judgment provided the backbone of the Court's
reasoning. 190

184. See id. at 320-21 (giving reasons why intellectual disability is a liability at trial).
185. See, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (requiring a more "depraved" mind
than the average murderer to qualify for the death penalty).
186. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319 ("If the culpability of the average murderer is insufficient to
justify the most extreme sanction available to the State, the lesser culpability of the mentally
retarded offender surely does not merit that form of retribution.").
187. See supra Part I.B (discussing difficulty in defining the class protected).
188. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1989 (2014).
189. Id.
190. See id. at 1996 (considering the objective indicia for use of the SEM); Atkins, 536 U.S. at
319 (discussing culpability of the intellectually disabled); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183
(1976) (discussing penological purposes of retribution and deterrence).
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When Moore addressed risk, it did so independently of either
prong of Eighth Amendment analysis and relied solely on risk for
portions of the opinion. In describing Atkins, Moore explained that
executing the intellectually disabled "serves no penological purpose;
runs up against a national consensus against the practice; and creates
a 'risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which
may call for a less severe penalty.' "191 In making such a list, Moore
placed "risk" alongside the subjective and objective prongs of Eighth
Amendment analysis, as if risk itself were another prong with a
determinative power in death penalty cases all on its own.
Moore did not place risk alongside the other two prongs
haphazardly. Other than a single paragraph on the Briseno factors, the
opinion never applies the objective indicia, and nowhere does it mention
how its independent judgment informed the analysis. 1 92 The opinion did
not discuss either prong in its invalidation of adaptive strengths or
coexisting conditions, and the dissent specifically noted that the
majority "abandon[ed] the usual mode of analysis this Court has
employed in Eighth Amendment cases." 193
Two other explanations may exist for the Court's reasoning, but
neither is adequate. First, the Court might have used its independent
judgment in deciding that medical standards must be better respected
by the states in defining intellectual disability. If true, however, the
Court did not mention its independent judgment either in name or by
reference to the culpability of the class of individuals affected by the
case. 194 If the Court was trying to use its own judgment, it somehow did
so without reference to culpability, deterrence, or any other penological
purpose-unlike every previous decision discussing that prong of the
Eighth Amendment.1 9 5 Instead, the Court relied solely on clinical
definitions and medical practice in identifying individuals fitting those
definitions, writing that Texas "disregard[ed] . . . current medical

standards," "deviated from prevailing clinical standards," and
"departed from clinical practice."1 96 Far from employing its own
judgment, the Court employed the judgment of the medical community

191.
citations
192.
193.
194.
Atkins).
195.
196.

Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, 2017 WL 1136278, at *9 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2017) (internal
omitted) (quotingAtkins, 536 U.S. at 313-20).
See id. at *13 (applying the objective indicia to Briseno).
See id. at *16 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
See id. at *9 (majority opinion) (reciting Eighth Amendment prongs by reference to
See supra Part L.A (discussing objective indicia and independent judgment).
Moore, 2017 WL 1136278, at *9, *11-12.
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in defining the proper procedures for determining whether a person is
intellectually disabled. 197
A second possible explanation could be that Moore is not an
Eighth Amendment case at all. Under this view, Atkins does all of the
Eighth Amendment analysis by exempting the intellectually disabled
from the death penalty, while Hall and Moore simply define what class
of individuals are covered. 198 This explanation, however, is also
unpersuasive. First, Hall and Moore obviously define the class to which
the Eighth Amendment protections of Atkins apply, and to the extent
they rule that certain individuals may not be executed, they are
straightforwardly constitutional cases. 199 Second, the decision in Atkins
"le[ft] to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce
the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences," 200 but
Hall specifies that Atkins did not give states "unfettered discretion to
define the full scope of the constitutional protection." 2 0 1 To the extent
that states go too far in excluding defendants under Atkins, the Court
holds that to be a violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Moore is therefore an Eighth Amendment constitutional case
that does not rely on the two traditional areas of Eighth Amendment
analysis. It does not rely on objective indicia, as noted by the dissent. 202
Nor does it rely on its independent judgment, because it considered any
questions on the defendant's culpability sufficiently answered by
Atkins. 203 Because of the original problems of defining the class in
Atkins, 204 Moore therefore had to turn to the "unacceptable risk" of a
deserving defendant being denied constitutional protections as an
independent basis for an Eighth Amendment decision.
D. The Problems Hall and Moore Made Worse
Regardless of whether Hall and Moore solved anything
regarding additional requirements, they appear to have made the
underinclusiveness problem worse. If those cases require more

197. Id.
198. See id. at *12 ("States may not execute anyone in 'the entire category of [intellectually
disabled] offenders.'" (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563-64 (2005))).
199. See id. at *4, Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014).
200. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) (alternations in original) (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416-17 (1986)).
201. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998; see also Moore, 2017 WL 1136278, at *9 ("States' discretion, we
cautioned, is not 'unfettered' ") (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998).
202. Moore, 2017 WL 1136278, at *16 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
203. See id. at *12 (majority opinion).
204. See supra Part I.C (discussing problems with Atkins).

1060

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3:1027

adherence to clinical definitions in determining whether a defendant is
excluded from the death penalty because of an intellectual disability,
then they seemingly approve of the age-of-onset prong. They therefore
do nothing to solve the problems faced by a defendant whose deficits
began after age eighteen, or who has insufficient evidence to prove
when the deficits started.
Recent changes to these clinical definitions could make these
situations even worse. The APA's latest revision to its definition of
intellectual disability removes the age cutoff, and replaces it with a
requirement that the deficits begin "during the developmental
period." 205 A state wishing to expand death penalty eligibility might
change its age-of-onset requirement to match the DSM-5's, and thereby
allow courts to disregard even evidence of intellectual disability before
age eighteen if the court determined that the defendant's
developmental period had already terminated. 206 Such an approach
would inject even more confusion into the age-of-onset analysis.
Although professional organizations supported the use of
clinical definitions in Hall to invalidate Florida's IQ cutoff and in Moore
to overturn the Briseno factors, they disagree with the legal use of the
age-of-onset prong.207 The APA, in a joint statement with the American
Bar Association and American Psychiatric Association, denounced the
use of the age-of-onset requirement specifically because it would
exclude conditions like dementia or traumatic brain injury. 20 8 The joint
statement explained that if a person with either condition meets the
intellectual and adaptive requirements, then "the reasoning in Atkins
should apply and an exemption from the death penalty is warranted,
because the only significant characteristic that differentiates these
severe disabilities from mental retardation is the age of onset." 2 0 9
III. ALIGNING DEFINITIONS WITH CULPABILITY AND RISK
Even after Hall and Moore, the Court has articulated no clear
test for whether a state's definition of intellectual disability violates

205. Compare DSM-5, supra note 7, at 33, 37-38 (onset during developmental period), with
DSM-IV-TR, supra note 7, at 41 (onset before age eighteen).
206. The problem of changing clinical definitions was noted by the dissent as a reason against
considering them. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2005-07 (Alito, J., dissenting).
207. See id. at 1994 (majority opinion) (agreeing with the APA).
208. RECOMMENDATION 122A, supra note 11; REPORT ON RECOMMENDATION 122A, supra note

11; AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N, supra note 11.
209. REPORT ON RECOMMENDATION 122A, supra note 11, at 5 (citing DSM-IV-TR, supra note
7, at 46, 135 (describing similar symptoms of dementia and intellectual disability)).
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Atkins. However, those three cases provided enough guidance that a
solution to their seemingly contradictory commands can be established.
An ideal solution would have three essential qualities. First, it
would place some constraints on how states can define intellectual
disability, and those constraints would be linked to clinical definitions;
this requirement ensures that Atkins still "provides substantial
guidance" on the question. Second, the solution would not completely
constrain state choice; this is necessary so that medical practice would
neither "dictate" the result nor impose "substantive or procedural
guides." Finally, the reason for selecting a particular solution would be
grounded in the same reasoning that produced Atkins, Hall, and Moore;
whatever middle ground is struck between strict adherence to clinical
definitions and total state choice must find support in the Court's
previous Eighth Amendment cases.
The best solution would therefore first require that states
exempt any defendant that meets clinical definitions, because the
language of Atkins, Hall, and Moore makes it clear that these
defendants are categorically not culpable enough to be executed. 210
Second, states could expand their definitions of intellectual disability to
cover more (but not fewer) defendants. 2 11 Finally, any restriction on who
may qualify, including restrictions found in clinical definitions, must
not exclude defendants similarly situated to those who receive the
exemption.
A. Substantial Guidance: The Minimum Protection
One element of this solution should be that any defendant
meeting clinical definitions is exempt from the death penalty. Hall
made this much clear when it claimed, "In the words of Atkins, those
persons who meet the 'clinical definitions' of intellectual disability 'by
have diminished capacities . . . .' Thus, they bear
definition . .
'diminish[ed] ... personal culpability.' "212 In connecting the clinical
definitions to a lower bound on the protection Atkins gives, Hall
declared that any defendant meeting at least those definitions is
exempt from the death penalty. 213
Moore supports the view that clinical definitions are a ceiling on
what defendants may be required to prove. Like Hall, it takes an
210. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1999.
211. See id. (requiring a minimum).
212. Id. (alterations in original) (internal citations omitted) (citing Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 318 (2002)).
213. See Slobogin, supra note 61, at 424 (connecting clinical definitions to Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence on culpability to establish a minimum).
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absolute view of Atkins, writing that it " 'restrict[s] ... the State's power
to take the life of any intellectually disabled individual." 2 14 Reading
clinical definitions as a ceiling also formulates a rule for "disregard" of
medical practice consistent with the opinion. 2 15 When the Court
invalidated how Texas considered Moore's adaptive strengths, prison
behavior, traumatic experiences, and coexisting conditions, it did so
only on the grounds that they departed from medical practice in a way
that restricted the scope of Atkins, leaving little other explanation for
"disregard" available to any possible solution. 2 16
The renewed focus on risk in Moore gives another reason to
enforce clinical practice. Although Moore purported to address the kind
of risk found in Hall, its invalidation of how Texas used evidence, in
addition to what evidence it considered, invokes the type of risk the
Court considered in Atkins as well. 2 17 In Atkins, the Court was
concerned that juries would misconstrue evidence that should have
factored against a death sentence as evidence favoring it.218 In Moore,
the Court made an analogous ruling with respect to state courts; it
found that Texas had used a risk factor for intellectual disability as
evidence against finding intellectual disability, and accordingly found
the practice to create an "unacceptable risk." 2 1 9

Moore also supports this view because its holding abrogates the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Mays. In that case, the Fifth Circuit held that
Hall did not bar the use of the Briseno factors, largely constraining Hall
to the facts of the case. 220 To the extent that Moore undercuts the
narrow view of Hall, the broader Sixth Circuit view of Hall described in
Van Tran-that "medical and professional expertise . . define and
explain how to diagnose the medical condition at issue"-appears to
prevail. 221
In practice, this could mean that consideration of the Flynn
Effect is next for the Court. Although its use is not without controversy,
a defendant who shows that considering the effect is a medical practice
in the same vein as the SEM could reverse a decision that did not also
consider adaptive deficits. 222

214.
536 U.S.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, 2017 WL 1136278, at *9 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2017) (quotingAtkins,
at 321).
See supraPart I.C. 1 (discussing possible interpretations of "disregard").
See supraPart II.C (discussing Moore's invalidation of Texas practices).
Moore, 2017 WL 1136278, at *11-12; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002).
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
Moore, 2017 WL 1136278, at *11-12.
See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing reasoning of Mays).
See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the Sixth Circuit's broad view of Hall).
See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Flynn effect).
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However, making clinical definitions a ceiling should not be the
only element of the solution. Hall and Moore still leave the states with
some amount of choice, noting that no definitive guides exist. If Hall
and Moore merely command that states exempt defendants who meet
clinical definitions, then the "substantial guidance" becomes a
"substantive guide." 2 2 3

B. No Substantive Guides: The States'Ability to Define
While clinical definitions set a limit on what requirements a
state can impose on a defendant alleging intellectual disability, nothing
would prevent a state from relaxing requirements beyond those set by
clinical definitions-even, of course, from abolishing the death penalty
for any offender.
Moore provides abundant support for this theory of state
flexibility in defining intellectual disability. First, it solves the issue on
how to interpret "disregard" by introducing a new rule: while states may
only consider factors used in clinical definitions, they would not have to
consider every factor found therein; states can remove requirements,
but not add to them. 22 4 Moore's focus on risk provides similar support.
Because the Briseno factors "[b]y design and in operation. . . 'create an
unacceptable risk,' "225 "they may not be used . .. to restrict qualification
of an individual as intellectually disabled." 226 These statements suggest
that deviating from clinical definitions in a way that expands, rather
than restricts, qualification for Atkins would be a permissible exercise
of state authority in this area.
The Seventh Circuit encountered such an expansive definition
in Pruitt v. Neal. 22 7 In Pruitt, the Seventh Circuit claimed that in Hall,
"the Supreme Court again declined to set forth a legal definition of
intellectual disability." 2 2 8 Although such a statement seems at odds
with Hall's clear rejection of the IQ cutoff, it makes more sense given
the Indiana statute before the court. Indiana's definition of intellectual
disability includes an age-of-onset prong with an age cutoff at twenty-

223. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1999, 2003 (2014) (requiring balance between
substantial guidance and substantive guide).
224. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing theories of "disregard" in Moore).
225. Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, 2017 WL 1136278, at *12 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2017) (quoting Hall,
134 S. Ct. at 1990).
226. Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
227. 788 F.3d 248, 250 (7th Cir. 2015).
228. Id. at 264.
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two rather than eighteen. 229 The Seventh Circuit correctly saw no
reason to discuss the more lenient age requirement (even though it
conflicted with clinical definitions), instead focusing primarily on
Indiana's restrictive intellectual-prong requirements. 2 3 0
Although that example may suggest that interpreting Hall to
allow for relaxed definitions is straightforward, it is not. When the
deviations from medical standards are quantitative, as seen in Hall and
Pruitt, determining whether the deviation is restrictive or expansive is
easy. However, unlike the IQ cutoff in Hall or the age cutoff in Pruitt,
there is not necessarily a determinative way of knowing whether
qualitative factors, like those in Briseno, are ones that will permissibly
expand the definition of intellectual disability or impermissibly contract
it. Because of this difficulty, a solution to Hall and Moore's
requirements requires one more piece.
C. Equal Protection:Protectingthe Similarly Situated
When Moore focused on risk, rather than traditional Eighth
Amendment analysis, it tacitly acknowledged that evaluating the issue
through the objective indicia and independent judgment was no longer
an adequate framework for deciding what Atkins requires of the
states. 23 1 Although it discussed the risk that "persons with intellectual
disability will be executed," it was implicitly concerned with a more
general kind of risk: that someone undeserving of the death penalty
would be subjected to

it.232

The Court, however, believed that it had already resolved this
matter in Atkins, where it held that all defendants of a certain level of
culpability (by virtue of their intellectual disability) could not be
executed.233 The problem at this point was that some defendants faced
execution while others did not, even though they shared the same level
of culpability. Although the Court could see the risk of undeserving

229. IND. CODE § 35-36-9-2 (2016); Pruitt, 788 F.3d at 264. Utah also sets the age-of-onset at
twenty-two, as did Maryland before it abolished its death penalty entirely. See MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 2-202(b)(1) (West 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-102 (West 2017).
230. Pruitt, 788 F.3d at 265-69.
231. See supra Part H.C.2 (discussing Moore's adoption of risk as an independent Eighth
Amendment factor).
232. See Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, 2017 WL 1136278, at *2 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2017) (discussing
the "unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed" (quoting Hall v.
Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014)); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (discussing the
"risk 'that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty'" (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978))).
233. See Moore, 2017 WL 1136278, at *9 ("[T]he Constitution 'restrict[s] ... the State's power
to take the life of any intellectually disabled individual.") (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321).
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defendants being executed, it could not find a way to avoid that risk
within the prongs of the Eighth Amendment, leading to vague
statements on the "disregard" of medical practice. 234
Because the Court's true concern is with functionally similar
defendants receiving different treatment, it cannot confine itself to the
Eighth Amendment for a solution. It is this comparison between
similarly situated defendants that makes the Equal Protection Clause
a more suitable framework for answering these questions.
Because Hall and Atkins are Eighth Amendment cases, they
have two meanings: that the states have indicated their positions (the
objective indicia) and that the Court agrees (the independent
judgment). So long as Atkins and Hall rest on the number of states that
follow (or refrain from) a practice, their rulings will remain opaque to
other courts attempting to discern their meanings.
This is because the Court does not necessarily evaluate the
reasons why states have chosen to forego imposing the death penalty
on a certain class of defendants. With so many Eighth Amendment
decisions relying, at least in part, on the number of states that impose
a requirement, using a traditional Eighth Amendment analysis would
not be fruitful in determining what Hall says about what definitions of
intellectual ability the states may use-it would tell us what the states
say, without explaining why they say it. When asking how far Hall goes
in requiring clinical definitions, then, looking to the Eighth Amendment
is misleading. Rather, we should ask who is similar enough under the
Equal Protection Clause.
Under an equal protection theory, the objective indicia of
consensus from the states are irrelevant-whether a defendant
challenging a death sentence is similarly situated to another defendant
exempt from the death penalty does not depend on how many states
agree. If a defendant challenges an arbitrary definition, the
arbitrariness would not decrease if approved by thirty states instead of
five.
This view allows us to eject the objective indicia when examining
how far Hall goes, leaving the Court's independent judgment as the
basis for determining which defendants are similarly situated. And that
part of Eighth Amendment analysis gives clear guidance on what to
consider.
The Court's independent judgment has consistently rested on
whether the punishment promotes the penological purposes of

234. See id. at *9 (prohibiting "disregard" of medical practice).
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retribution and deterrence. 235 In contrast to the chaotic objective
indicia, the Court is remarkably uniform regarding what counts in
independent judgment, where it considers whether penological
purposes are served by the punishment in question. The Court has
reiterated this commitment to ensuring a punishment enforces only
valid penological goals in virtually every Eighth Amendment case
brought before it.236
Moore provides further support for the need to compare similarly
situated defendants. Its focus on the risk "that persons with intellectual
disability will be executed" 237 harkens back to earlier statements of the
risk "that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which
may call for a less severe penalty" 2 3 8 or that "the jury may impose the
death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner." 2 39 Moore is
therefore a signal that the Court is searching for a workable standard
for "unacceptable risk" in death penalty cases-one which the Equal
Protection Clause provides. When added to the holdings of Atkins and
Hall, Moore's framing of risk means that the Court will invalidate a
practice that puts a person similarly situated to an Atkins-protected
defendant at an "unacceptable risk' of execution.
1. Solving Additional Requirements
In this solution, determining which deviations
are
impermissible additional requirements would involve finding whether
those requirements produce an unacceptable risk of imposing the death
penalty on defendants similarly situated, in terms of retribution and
deterrence, to those who receive the Atkins exemption by meeting
clinical definitions.
235. See, e.g., Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992-93; Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2472 n.11 (2012);
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 67-68 (2010); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441-46 (2008);
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-21; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833-38 (1988); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-801 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
236. See, e.g., Graham, 560 U.S. at 67 ("The judicial exercise of independent judgment
requires consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and
characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question. In this inquiry the Court
also considers whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals."
(internal citations omitted)); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833 ("[W]e . . . consider whether the
application of the death penalty to this class of offenders 'measurably contributes' to the social
purposes that are served by the death penalty." (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798)); Enmund, 458
U.S. at 798 ("Unless the death penalty ... measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it
'is nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering,' and hence an
unconstitutional punishment." (quoting Coker, 433 U.S. at 592)).
237. Moore, 2017 WL 1136278, at *4 (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990).
238. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320.
239. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 503 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808 (1991).
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Under this framework, quantitative restrictions like Florida's IQ
cutoff are easily solved: they either make intellectual disability easier
to prove or make it more difficult. Moore made clear that extra factors
"may not be used, as [Texas] used them, to restrict qualification of an
individual as intellectually disabled." 240 Qualitative restrictions like
Briseno, however, would involve a more searching analysis of the
departure from clinical definitions to determine whether they would
exempt similarly situated defendants from Atkins.
Taking the Briseno factors as an example is illustrative of how
to approach the problem. The Briseno factors directed Texas courts to
ask a series of questions to supplement the adaptive prong of Atkins. 2 4 1
These included examining the opinions of family and friends on the
defendant's intellectual disability, whether the defendant could
formulate and carry out plans, whether he showed leadership, how
coherently he responded to questions, whether he could lie effectively,
and whether the facts of the crime demonstrated forethought and
planning. 242
A comparison to clinical practice quickly establishes that these
questions worked to exclude defendants from the Atkins protection, not
to include more of them. Clinical definitions of adaptive ability require
the defendant to prove deficits in one domain out of three: if a defendant
can show a deficit in the conceptual, social, or practical domain, then
the adaptive prong is met regardless of any other adaptive strengths
that the defendant possesses in other areas. 243 By asking questions
focusing on what a defendant could do (rather than could not, as clinical
definitions ask), the Briseno factors prevented a defendant with
adaptive strengths from making a successful Atkins claim, even though
he was similarly situated to defendants who are exempt from the death
penalty.
2. Solving Underinclusiveness
The application of penological purposes is more straightforward
with respect to the underinclusiveness problem. This rule rejects any
requirement imposed by clinical definitions that would exclude a
defendant equally or less culpable than one with intellectual disability.

240. Moore, 2017 WL 1136278, at *4.
241. Exparte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8-9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
242. Id.
243. DSM-5, supra note 7, at 37; see also John H. Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins
v. Virginia and Its Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625, 628 (2009) (noting that
empirical data suggests Briseno factors result in higher rejection rate of Atkins claims).

1068

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:3:1027

Because the age-of-onset prong was imported directly from
clinical definitions, its connection to deterrence and culpability is
questionable. 24 4 Although equal protection challenges to the age-ofonset prong have failed, Hall changes the analysis by connecting
clinical definitions to penological purposes. 245 Because the time at
which a defendant begins manifesting symptoms is unconnected to
society's interest in retribution or the extent to which the defendant
could be deterred, there would be a substantial risk that a defendant no
more culpable than one protected by Atkins could face execution. 246 The
arbitrary nature of that age cutoff is analogous to the "conspicuously
artificial lines" drawn in Skinner, and the previously discussed
Cleburne and Heller cases suggest that, at a minimum, some higher
level of scrutiny would apply even if Skinner's Eighth Amendment
fundamental rights paradigm is not adopted. 24 7
That the age-of-onset prong is part of clinical definitions of
intellectual disability would be unlikely to save it. Moore tellingly
claims that "[t]he medical community's current standards supply one
constraint on States' leeway in this area." 2 48 Yet the Court has never
discussed any "constraint" other than clinical practice, suggesting that
other restrictions could constrain even the use of medical standards.
And while Moore asks states to not "disregard" medical standards, it
also claims that it "does not demand adherence to everything stated in
the latest medical guide." 249
A harder question would be how this framework applies to
defendants with serious mental illness. A court addressing this
question would require a more reaching analysis of how defendants
with intellectual disabilities and those with serious mental illnesses
differ, both in terms of an interest in retribution against these

244. See Farahany, supra note 26, at 859 (on problems with importing clinical definitions);
Mulroy, supranote 12, at 596 (on the age-of-onset prong).
245. See supra Section I.C.2 (discussing the failure of equal protection challenges).
246. See Mulroy, supra note 12, at 597 (arguing for the equal protection challenge).
247. See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 (1993) (suggesting higher standard than rational basis);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding discriminatory law arbitrary
and therefore unconstitutional even under rational basis); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535, 542 (1942) (strict scrutiny applied for Eighth Amendment fundamental right); supra
Section I.C.2 (discussing the standard of review for equal protection cases involving persons with
intellectual disabilities).
248. Moore v. Texas, No. 15-797, 2017 WL 1136278, at *14 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2017) (emphasis
added).
249. Id. at *9.
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defendants and the extent to which they could be deterred from crime
by the death penalty. 250
CONCLUSION

While there is broad consensus that the intellectually disabled
should not be executed, there is considerably less agreement about
which defendants are categorically not culpable enough for the penalty
to be imposed. 251 When Atkins left definitions of intellectual disability
to the states, states responded by largely adopting the clinical
definitions of the APA and AAIDD, opening the possibility that those
definitions would inappropriately treat defendants with a similar level
of culpability differently. 252
After emphasizing the importance of clinical definitions in
Atkins, the Supreme Court specified in Hall and Moore that it is
impermissible to deviate from those definitions by imposing on
defendants a hard cutoff on IQ scores or considering evidence outside of
that considered by medical practitioners. 2 5 3 Although Hall and Moore
appear to require strict adherence to clinical definitions, seemingly
conflicting statements within the opinions muddle how closely states
must hew to those definitions. 254
The best way to resolve these cases is instead to characterize
their rulings as requiring any definition of intellectual disability to pose
no unacceptable risk to defendants with a similar culpability. This
solution provides a resolution to two unresolved Atkins problems.
States would not be able to add additional requirements if they had the
effect of narrowing the class eligible for Atkins protection, and
defendants left out of clinical definitions but similarly situated to
defendants falling within them would be protected.
Clinton M. Barker*

.

250. See Farahany, supra note 26, at 864 (arguing that these two groups are similarly
situated); supra Section I.C.2 (recounting failure of the equal protection challenge prior to Hall).
251. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317 (2002) ("Not all people who claim to be
[intellectually disabled] will be so impaired as to fall within the range of [intellectually disabled]
offenders. .
252. Id.
253. Moore, 2017 WL 1136278, at *4; Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 2000 (2014).
254. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1998-99 (explaining requirements for states to follow in definitions
of intellectual disability).
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